From War To Uncertainty: Shifting Sands In Mideast-By-Syed Ata Hasnain

If the Israel-Iran confrontation dominated the airwaves, it is the maritime domain that has quietly emerged as the most urgent front in the Middle East’s evolving security landscape. The Houthi missile and drone campaign against Red Sea shipping has disrupted global commerce, driving up insurance premiums and forcing the rerouting of maritime traffic around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. — Internet

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The war, perhaps, could not have been elongated without full-scale American involvement, and that was never the intent of President Donald Trump anyway

The recent 12-day military exchange between Israel and Iran marked a moment of profound strategic ambiguity in the Middle East. It was not a war in the traditional sense, nor was it a fleeting skirmish. It signaled the culmination of years of indirect conflict spilling into the open. Neither Iran, Israel, nor the United States emerged with a decisive victory. But if one nation walked away with enhanced psychological and strategic confidence, it was Iran. I am aware this assumption may be debatable but leaving aside the nuclear aspects, which anyway cannot be confirmed, in no other way did Iran appear vanquished. The war, perhaps, could not have been prolonged without full-scale American involvement, and that was never the intent of President Donald Trump anyway.

What the region is now witnessing is not the resolution of conflict, but a recalibration of postures — military, ideological and geopolitical. A reshaped security architecture is gradually emerging, with broader consequences not just for the Middle East, but for the global order. From the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, from Tehran’s ideological arc to the Levant, the fault lines are shifting — and new dangers are germinating beneath the surface; the most dangerous of these, in my opinion, being the eventual emergence of a new brand of Iranian proxies. Smitten by the severe mauling in Gaza and in Lebanon, these proxies may be of a kind not seen in the region but replicating the culture of an extremist organization such as the Islamic State, or ISIS.

The Israel-Iran confrontation was long expected but carefully avoided — until this year, when it briefly broke the bounds of shadow warfare. While Israel’s limited retaliation and Iran’s measured yet unprecedented missile barrage showcased both capability and restraint, it also illustrated the limits of escalation among two powerful regional adversaries. The United States, with its military presence, limited use and diplomatic leverage, played an important role with no controls on final regional outcomes despite broader regional reverberations.

Iran, crucially, emerged with its deterrence somewhat intact. By demonstrating that it could absorb Israeli retaliatory strikes and respond with precision attacks — without inviting overwhelming reprisal — it sent a message to allies and adversaries alike that the Islamic Republic remains a central player in the region’s strategic balance.

There are two beliefs here. One that feeds into a growing perception that Iran can continue pursuing its security objectives, especially the expansion of Shia influence. The second, that strategic ambiguity about Iran’s nuclear pursuit and dispersed proxy strength will continue to be major considerations for the US, Israel and the Arabs.

For Iran, the real victory may lie not in the missiles fired but in narratives shaped. Its capacity to endure and retaliate without regime collapse is likely to bolster its long-term objective, consolidating what many analysts term the “Shia Crescent” — an arc of influence stretching from Lebanon through Syria and Iraq into Yemen.

A new-found respect for Iran is also perceived among many Arab nations. Despite the much-publicised China-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, ideological rivalry between Shia theocratic ambition and Sunni Arab monarchies remains very much alive. Iran’s strategic patience is intact although its proxies remain in disarray. Yet in the long run, they may be the viable instruments of influence.

It’s the Levant area, the strategically crucial space between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, where Iran may probably have lost influence; especially in Syria. The weakening of the IRGC leadership will delay the regaining of dominance here. The simmering storm we should fear is a return of Hamas and Hezbollah. Their leadership is down, but not their spirit. Iran’s proxies with their survivalist instincts extremely strong cannot disappear into oblivion; the nature of their return will be a vital force-multiplier.

If the Israel-Iran confrontation dominated the airwaves, it is the maritime domain that has quietly emerged as the most urgent front in the Middle East’s evolving security landscape. The Houthi missile and drone campaign against Red Sea shipping has disrupted global commerce, driving up insurance premiums and forcing the rerouting of maritime traffic around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. The US and several allies launched “Operation Prosperity Guardian” in December 2023.

This is a naval coalition designed to secure one of the world’s most critical trade arteries. India, while not a formal member, has undertaken independent deployments under Operation Sankalp, underscoring its maritime stakes in the region. France, Britain, and even Japan have similarly opted for national responses, suggesting the erosion of multilateral consensus in maritime security. This fragmentation has longer-term implications. The Western Indian Ocean is rapidly militarising and the old assumption that sea lanes are universally secure is being challenged. India needs to be seen to be leading the charge here.

A maritime security order has been knocking for a long time, especially since China’s PLA Navy started to treat this as a major area of interest. Just a decade ago, ISIS capitalised on power vacuums and local grievances to burst onto the global stage when Iraq erupted into disorder. Today, the ingredients for a new cycle of violent extremism are reassembling. Fragmented governance, sectarian divides, economic despair, and unaddressed geopolitical grievances which continue to fester across the Levant.

Tech-savvy terror groups with drone proliferation, ideological orientation, encrypted communication, and dark web financial flows now make it easier for even small outfits to punch above their weight. Could we be on the threshold of the incubation phase of another wave of global Islamist extremism? Iran’s regional allies, though nominally under its control, may pursue independent agendas if weakened or cornered. Similarly, Sunni extremist groups may exploit the new vacuum if attention remains focused solely on state actors. The Middle East today is neither at war nor at peace. The traditional conflicts — Israel-Palestine, Shia-Sunni and Iran-Israel — are all in conditions of transition with high unpredictability.
The United States retains force presence but lacks a unifying doctrine. And regional actors like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey are hedging their bets — seeking security, but with their own agenda. For India, this is a time to watch closely and act deliberately. The security of its maritime lifelines, the stability of its energy partners, and the containment of extremism are all directly tied to how the Middle East settles — or fails to settle — after this period of fire.

Syed Ata Hasnain, a retired lieutenant-general, is a former commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps. He is also associated with the Vivekananda International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.